Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy / Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson
Tipo de material: TextoDetalles de publicación: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2007 Descripción: XV, 416 p. : gráf. ; 24 cmISBN: 978-0-521-85526-6Tema(s): Democracia -- Aspectos económicos | DictaduraResumen: This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.Resumen: Índice: Part I. Questions and Answers: 1. Paths of political development: 1. Britain; 2. Argentina; 3. Singapore; 4. South Africa, 5. The agenda; 2. Our argument: 1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy; 2. Building blocks of our approach; 3. Towards our basic story; 4. Our theory of democratization; 5. Democratic consolidation; 6. Determinants of democracy; 7. Political identities and the nature of conflict; 8. Democracy in a picture; 9. Overview of the book; 3. What do we know about democracy?: 1. Measuring democracy; 2. Patterns of democracy; 3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution; 4. Crises and democracy; 5. Social... Etc.Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca de origen | Signatura | URL | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | Reserva de ítems |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Monografías | 07. BIBLIOTECA CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y JURÍDICAS | 321.7/ACE/eco (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | Texto completo | Disponible Ubicación en estantería | Bibliomaps® | 3742719142 |
Índice alfabético
Bibliografía: p. 381-399
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.
Índice: Part I. Questions and Answers: 1. Paths of political development: 1. Britain; 2. Argentina; 3. Singapore; 4. South Africa, 5. The agenda; 2. Our argument: 1. Democracy vs. nondemocracy; 2. Building blocks of our approach; 3. Towards our basic story; 4. Our theory of democratization; 5. Democratic consolidation; 6. Determinants of democracy; 7. Political identities and the nature of conflict; 8. Democracy in a picture; 9. Overview of the book; 3. What do we know about democracy?: 1. Measuring democracy; 2. Patterns of democracy; 3. Democracy, inequality and redistribution; 4. Crises and democracy; 5. Social... Etc.
No hay comentarios en este titulo.