Bibliografia. Index

Contiene: Dedication -- Preface -- I : Preliminaries -- Introduction -- 1. Constructive ethical pragmatism -- II : The moral authority of the moral community -- 2. The idea of the moral community -- 3. Authoritative input -- 4. The unity of the moral community -- 5. Introducing new moral norms -- 6. Working it out together -- 7. Ratification of new moral norms -- III : Defending and extending the account -- 8. Reasons, indeterminacy, and compromise -- 9. Noneternal moral principles -- 10. Objectivity and path-dependence -- Conclusion -- References -- Index

"As this highly original work explains, morality is not fixed objectively, independently of all human judgment, nor is it something that we invent. Rather, working within zones of objective indeterminacy, the moral communitythe community of all personshas the authority to introduce new moral norms. These further specify the preexisting moral norms, making an objective difference to individuals moral rights and duties. The moral community, so-called, could not exercise authority unless it had some structure whereby it could act. Unlike political communities, which are centralized, noninclusive, and backed by coercion, the moral community is decentralized and inclusive. Its structure depends upon dyadic dutiesones that one individual owes to another. Such duties, the book argues, empower efforts by individuals to work out intelligently with one another how to respond to morally important concerns. The innovative moral input that these efforts can provide is initially authoritative only over the parties involved. Yet when such innovations gain sufficient uptake and have been reflectively accepted by the moral community, they become new moral norms. This account of the moral communitys moral authority is motivated by, and supports, a type of normative ethical theory, constructive ethical pragmatism (CEP), which rejects the consequentialist claim that rightness is to be defined as a function of goodness and the deontological claim that principles of right are fixed independently of the good. Rather, it holds instead that what we ought to do is fixed by our continuing efforts to specify the right and the good in light of each other." --